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N e;cc () h'"' J, IL 
- £ '') 6. Before leaving orFan extended trtp abroad, A signed a number of checks in blank 
and put them in his safe. He instructed his bookkeeper to fill in the checks from 
time to time to meet his farm payrolls. On a week-end a burglar broke into the office 
and into the safe, took the checks and used A's check-writer to fill in the checks 
for $100 each. Later the burglar negotiated these checks for value to innocent 
merchants. The merchants deposited the checks in the First National Bank, which 
charged the checks against the accow1t of A. 
On the same occasion the burglar found ten $20 bills in the safe which he also 
used to purchase goods from a merchant who acted in good faithi A had in his possess-
ion the serial numbers of these bills. 
The burglar found a $300 check payable to the order of A ~nd endorsed in blank 
by A lying in the letter basket on A's desk. The burglar us~d this check to make a 
down payment on an automobile. 
A brought actions against (l)the First National Bani{ to require it to cred\'this 
_:tccount with the amount of the stolen checks for which it had debited his account, 
and (2) sued the merchant in trover for the ten $20 bills, and(3) sued the automobile 
d0aler for the $)00. 
How should the court rule on these three actions? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS((l)Section 15 of the N.I.L. reads, ttWhen an incomplete 
instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated without 
authority, be a valid contract in the hands of any holder., as against any person 
whose signature was placed thereon before delivery." There has been great conflict 
of authority as to how this section should be applied. As to the drawee bank the 
better.view is that the drawee bank is not a holder since the instrument is not 
negotiated to it but presented to it for payment. It has no means to detect the 
invalidity of the instrument so the loss should be on the person who made it 
possible. That person, as a part of his contract of deposit, impliedly promised the 
bank not to expose it to unreasonable liability by signing blank checks. 
(2)and(3) A's equity of ownership was cut off in both cases by a negotiation to a 
holder in due course. 
Ques~ion 6 on P•474(Negotiable Instruments) u.c.C.#3-407(3) reverses the rule set 
forth ln Section 15 of the N:.I.L. The u.c.c. now reads., 11A subsequent holder in due 
course may in all cases enforce the instrument according to its original tenor, and 
when an incomplete instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as completed 
Hence A is not entitled to .any relief as against the bank. As for the money, that 
is negotiable at common law.(The u.c.c. does not apply to money). As for the $300 
check indorsed in blank by A, that was be~er paper and could be negotiated by 
delivery only. By U.C.C.#3-305 a holder 1n due course takes the instrument free 
from all claims to it on the part of any person • 
• 
. r:y $Cl 
t 7. C executed ~n J.ns'trwnent in fonn a~ follows: "On or before Jan.l,l956, I promise 
• to pay to th~ order of B the sum of fJ.~e hundred dollars, with interest at 5 per 
cent. (signed)C ·" · 
B, who is 18 years of age, endorsed the instrument in blank and for value deliver-
ed it to R. R, for value, endorsed the same as follows: "Pay to the order of x 
without recourse on me. (signed)R." and delivered the same to X. ' 
The debt, evidenced by the instrument, was not paid and X sued C and B upon the 
instrument, after giving notice to B of non-payment. C pleaded no consideration and 
that X was not a holder in due course. B pleading infancy. 
(1) Is C liable? (2) Is B liable? · 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) The instrunent is negotiable as it may be made payable on 
or before a certain time at the opt~on of the holder without destroying negotiability 
(Section 4 of N.I.L.) An indorsement without recourse is not enough in itself to 
warn the indorsee that something may be v~ong. It follows that 
(l)C is liable to X as X is a holder in due course and takes free from the defense 
of no consideration. An infant has the power to transfer his interest to another. 
(2) B is not liable as he has the real defense of infancy. · 
Question 7 on p.475(Negotiable Instruments) would be answered the same way under 
the U.?.C• Section 3-109(l)(a) reads, "An instrument is payable at a definite time 
if by J. ts terms it is payable on or before a state date *lH~,,. 
* 2)CJ . 8. The defendant purchased a car from a dealer who represented it to be a new 
• 
demonstrator. In fact, the car was a used one. The defendant executed a negotiable 
note for the balance of the purchase price and a chattel mortgage on forms which 
were furnished the dealer by the plaintiff finance company. The plaintiff was to 
finance t.he sale and the note was payable at the office of the plaintiff. Both the 
bill of r.ale and the chattel mortgage described the car as a new demonstrator. The 
note was endorsed in blank by the dealer and along with the bill of sale and chattel 
mortgage was sent to the office of the finance company. Prior to the receipt of the • 
certificate of title from the State, the finance company paid the dealer for the 
note. The title showed that the car was used, and the defendant refused to pay 
further installments. There HaS evidence that the plaintiff financed the arrangement 
by w!lich the dealer obtained possession of the car initially frorr the factory and 
th::tt upon the first sale of the car the plaintiff had held a chattel mortgage which 
had been satisfied. 
The plaintiff financiaJ. company brings an action upon the note and the defendant 
d'efends upon the basis of misrepresentation. vJhat should be the result? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) Eith•3r of the answers given below should be equally accept-
able. 
First answer: Plaintiff can r <Jcover. It is a holder in due course. It gave value 
and was under no duty to wait until the certificate of title came through. It pur-
chased in actual good faith as it had honestly forgotten the prior transaction. It 
was under no duty to search al). U.s records when there was nothing to put it 
on guard. Second answer: Judgment for defendant. The tendency is more and more to 
regard a company that financ es all sales of a seller vti thout question as standing 
in the shoes of the seller. Plaintiff had actual knowledge from its prior dealings 
that the car was a used oar and henQe could not buy in good faith. 
• 
• 
• 
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8. On December 1st1 John Flippen drew a check on Third National Bank payable to 
Herman Upcreeoh in the sum of $SOO. The check was delivered by Flippen to Upcreech 
as a down payment on a grand piano. On receipt of the oheok, Upcreech went directly 
to the Cashier of the Bank and had the check certified. On December 2nd, Upcreeeh 
by endorsement and delivery negotiated the check for value to Herbert Sunday. Also 
on December 2nd1 Flippen having learned that Upcreech was a person of bad moral 
character, ordered the Bank to stop payment on the check. On December )rd, when 
Sunday presented the check to the Bank for payment, payment was refused. Sunday on 
the same day asked your advice on whether he could recover from {a)Flippen,(b)the 
Bank, or(c) Upcreeoh. What should you have advised him as to each? 
(NEGOTIABlE INSTRUMENTS)(a) He cannot recover from the drawer,Flippen. When the 
payee had the check certified the drawer was discharged. It is the same as if payee 
had cashed tile check, and then, with the proceeds thereof, had bought the Bank's 
paper. See N.I.L. section 188 or V#6·S42.(b) Sunday may recover from Bank. It becam£ 
primarily liable when it certified the check, and presumably charged Flippen's 
account at ~hat time. (c) Since Upcreech inaorsed after certification he added his 
secondary l1ability to the Bank•s primary liability and will be liable if proper 
proceedings on dishonor are taken. 
Q.8 .on p.49l(Negotiable Instruments)(a) Same answer for same reason under U.C.C. 
#3-411(1). (b) Same answer for same reason under U.C.C.HJ-411(1), "Certification of c 
check is acceptance. Under U.G.Co #4-303 a drawer cannot stop payment on a check 
after it has been certified.{c) Same answer for same reason. u.c.C.#J-411 (1) reads 
in part, "Where the holder procures certification the drawer and all prior indorsers 
are discharged. Uprscreech was not a prior indorser and hence is liable if proper 
proceedings on dishonor are taken. 
0 '5' '7 9. On November ~, 1959, Sam Toney signed a contract of purchase by which he b elievect 
he acquired title to a 1957 Oldsmobile from Simon Bunch. On being delivered the 
vehicle on the same day, Toney executed and handed to Bunch his negotiable promiss-
ory notes in the sum of $1,850 payable on December 2, 1959. On November )rd,Bunch 
endorsed and delivered the note to Good Car Corporation as the purchase price of a 
used automobile in which Bunch promptly drove off to parts unknown. On November 12th 
Good Car Corporation endorsed and delivered the note for value ·to Ray Thomas, an 
old aoquaimtance of Bunch~ On December 1st, when State Police seized the Oldsmobile ~ 
Toney for the first time learned that the oar purportedly sold him had not belonged 
to Bunch but that the latter had stolen it. Having this knowledge, Toney refused to 
honor the note when Thomas presented it to him for payment on December 2nd. Thomas 
at onc·e brought an action against Toney on the note in the Law and Equf ty Court of 
the City of Richmond. Toney has employed you to represent him in defense of the 
action. He informs you of the foregoing facts and states that it can be shown that, 
although Good Car Corporation knew nothing of the unlawful conduct of Bunch at the 
time it received the note, Thomas did know of Bunch's fraud when Thomas acquired tho 
note. He further tells you that Thomas did not aid Bunch in the commission of the 
fraud. What defense, if any, may Toney make to ·the action on the note? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRill1ENTS) None. The Good Car Corporation was a holder in due course 
and has the whole world{with the exception of Bunch and persons in collusion with 
him)for a market. Thomas traces his title through a holder in due course and hence 
has all the rights of such a holder. See sections 57 and 58 of the N.I.L. or 
V#6-409 and 410. 
# Q.9 on P·4~2(Negotiable Instruments) Same answer for same reason under u.c.c. 
1r .3-201~1) wh1ch reads as follows: "Transfer of an instrument vests in the transfer.: r 
such r~ghte as the transferor has therei n, except that a transferee who has himself 
been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior 
holder had notice of a defense or claim against it cannot improve his position by 
taking from a later holder in due course • 
·::!~ 0 
6. Hemlock requested Solar to execute a negotiable promissory note, and Hope to en-
dorse it in blank, each for the accommodation of Heffilock. This they did, and Hemlock 
then sold the note for value to Bristol Bank and Loan Co., which had knowledge that 
Solar was an accommodation maker and that Hope 1vas an accommodation endorser. The 
note was not paid at maturity, and the Bristol Bank and Loan Co. sued Solar and Hope, 
507· 
each of whom defended on the g~ound that the Bristol Bank and Loan Co. was not a 
ho;_der in due course, as it had notice of the accommodation ;vhi~h constituted an 
infirmity in the paper. Is this valid defense? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) No~ The accon~dating parties have impliedly requested any 
one who wishes to give value on the faith of their signatures to do so. When the 
Bank purchased the note it acted on the request and suffered a l egal detriment, and 
in so doing provided the consideration needed to support the promises of the defend-
ants to honor the note as per their agreement. 
Q. 6 on p.506(Negotiable Instrument ) s 
f/3-415(2) which reads, "Where the ins~rum:~ ~~~w~~e~o~a~~~ ;:evr~aso~ under,U·?•C• 
due the accommodation party is liable in the capacity in which heah~= s~for~ lt lS 
though the taker knows of the accommodation." gne even 
7 !s~fth executed his negotiable promissory note to Brown, in the amount of ~Pl,OOO, 
pa.yable sixty days after date at The Virginia National Bank. The note contained the 
usual provision of waiver of presentment, protest and notice of dishonor. Before 
maturity, Brovm for value negotiated the note by endorsement to The Virginia 
National Bank, whlchreld the note on its maturity date. On the maturity date, Smith 
had on deposit with The Virginia National Bank, in a checking account, the sum of 
$1,500. Two days after the maturi ty of the note, Smith withdrew all of the funds 
from his checking account. Shortly thereafter the Bank called upon Brown for payment. 
Brown refused to pay, and the Bank sued r.im upon the note . Nay the Bank recover? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) No. Section 70 of the N .I.L. provides t hat if a note is • 
payable at a special place, and if the maker is able and willing to pay it there at 
maturity, such ability and willingness are equivalent. to a tender. Section 87 pro-
vides that where the instrument i s made payable at a bank i t is equivalent to an 
order to the bank to pay the same. w~ile the defenses of no pr es8ntment and no 
notice of dishonor have been waived, that of t ender has not. A valid tender dis-
charges persons secondarily liable. It vras the banks folly not to charge Smith's 
account on the maturity date of the instrument. 
Q. 7 on p.507(Negotiable Instruments) Virginia has changed two sections of the 
u.c.c. so that the Virginia law is different from that of other states. By u.c.c. 
#3-121 as adopted in Virginia "A note or acceptance which states that it is payable 
at a bank is not of itself an order to the bank to pay it, but the bank may consider 
it an authorization to pay". And by U.C.C.#J-604(3) as adopted in Virginia there is 
no tender by a maker or acceptor by the fact that he has funds at the bank at which 
the instrument is payable when it is due unless he has specifically ordered the bank 
to make payment out of such funds. Despite the above, the result reached in the 
N.r.L. answer would still be the same. At the date of maturity of the note Bank owed 
Smith $1500, and Smith owed Bank $1,000. Bank had a common law· banker's lien 
(really a right of set-off) which it could have used as security. When it released 
the security by allowing Smith to check out the $1500 on deposit without the consent 
of the indorser(surety) the latter was discharged on common law suretyship principle~ 
• 
• 
• 
l\ t;V · 
7.~agg seeks your advice about the advisability of purchasing from Pepper,at a 
very attractive discount, the following instru;ent: 
"Salem, Virginia 
"I promise to pay Salter, or order, $1~000 on Nov.6,1961, plus interest at 
6% payable semi-annually. 
"(a) In the event of default in the payment of any interest installment, the 
entire principal amount shall become due and payable. 
"(b) In the event of default of pa;Yment of principal at maturity, the three 
certificates of stock in I.B.M. Corp., pinned to this note, may be sold by 
the holder on account of this obligation. 
"(c) This note is . secured by deed of trust on the -farm 'Blackswan,' recorded 
in the Clerk's office of the Circuit Court of Roanoke County. 
"(d) The maker and endorsers waive the benefit of th.eir homestead exemption 
as to this debt. Adam Mustard" 
On the back of the instrument appear the signatures of Salter and Pepper. Bragg 
tells you that he knows nothing about Mustard or the circumstances of the execution 
of the instrwnent or of its transfer to Pepper, but he knows Salter and Pepper to be 
substantial businessmen. He wishes to know whether the provisions in any of para-
graphs(a),(b),(c),(d), or (e) the fact that the instrument is not -dated, or (f)the 
fact that the place of payment is not specified, renders the instrument non-negoti-
able. What would you advise him with respect to each question? 
(NEGOTIABLE INS'lRUMEN'IS)I would advise him that none of the facts stated from (a) 
through (f) would render the instrument non-negotiable. 
a) This is permitted by V#6-354(3) and by the last paragraph of V#6-J56. 
b) V#6-357 reads in part, "But the negotiable character of an instrument otherwise 
negotiable is not affected by a provision which:(l)Authorizes the sale of collateral 
sec uri ties in the case the instrument be not paid at maturity". 
c) The same -section also provides"(5) States that such instrument is secured by a 
deed of trust referred to therein." 
d) It also provides 11(3) Waives the benefit of any law intended for the advantage 
or protection of the obligor" • 
e) VN6-358 reads· in part, "The validity and negotiable character of an instrument 
are not affected by the fact that: (l)It is not dated." 
:t) Or tt (3) _Does not specify the place where it ie drawn or the place where it. ; • 
'Q~saf,;n p.S21 The answer would be the same under the u.c.c. 
(a) u.c.C.#J-109{l){c) expressly provides that an instrument is payabl? at a 
definite time if it is payable at a definite time subject to any accelerat1on. 
(b) u .c .C.#3-112(l)(b) reads, uThe negotiability of a~ instrument is not affect · 
ed by a statement that collateral has been given for the 1nstrument or in case of 
default on the instrument the collateral may be sold.u . . . . (c) u.c.C.#3-10S(l)(e) reads, ItA promise or order otherm.se uncond1t1onal 1s not 
made conditional by the fact that the instrument states that it is secured whether 
by mortgage ~H'* or otherwise •" · i t ff t (d) u.c.c. #3-ll2(l)(e) reads, nThe negotiability of an instrument s no a . ec · 
ed by a term purporting to waive the benefit of any law intended for the advantage 
or protection of any obligor. fi it tim b (e) Under u.c.c. #3-109(l)(a) the instrument is payable at a de ~ e e a-
cause it is payable on Nov.6, 1961. Hence it is immaterial that the 1nstrument is 
not dated. · il . t f · t ent is no· (f) u .c.c. #3-112 (l)(a) reads in part, "The negot1ab 1 y o an _1ns rum 
affected by the omission of a statement ~H'* of the place where the 1nstrurnent is 
drawn or payable • 
/) "0 B. 'Farmville Bank made demarxi on Innocent for payment of the following instruments 
•$100.00 Oct.25,1960 Farmville, Virginia 
On demand, I promise to pay to bearer at Farmville Bank, $100.00 
The endorsers hereof waive protest,presentment and notice of dishonor. 
Th · Nat InnocentM 
. e s~gna ture of Innocent em the iMtrument a ears b · -~sa clever forgery. on the back of it ap t~p •· to e genu~ne, but in reality 
Irmocent seeks your advice as to his liabl~~ ~ F ~gna~ures of Frauder and Innocent~ 
that Frauder brought the note to him when th ,Y . annv~lle Bank, and he tells you 
blank and reque~ted Innocent to become maker~ ~~~~e~~rd!~~imaker•s ~ignature was 
but agreed to s~gn as accommodatio d . ned to s~gn as maker, 
Frauder would become maker o n en orser after the s~gnature of Frauder, if 
instead of signing it as mak!rth; no:e· Frauder and Innocent endorsed the note, bu·t 
the note to Farmville Bank. A~t~~e~h;~rged I~ocent•s ~ignature as maker and sold ~dt(~)n~=e~n~~:;~t~seeks your advice as !~r~1i~a~~~t~st~ ~~!d~:n!(a)~: :~~~;: 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS)(a)Innocent · t li forgery and he is not estopped to ~s~o able as a maker for his signature was a 
dorser because every indorser imp~o~ im. V#6~J75.(b)Innocent is liable as an in-
in all respects what it purports to ebe: ;r~4~isa:at~~~.instrument is genuine and 
Q. 8 on p.52l.(a) Under the u.c.c. Innocent wou~a be ~~abLe as maKer under the pro-
visions of u.c.C.#3-115 dealing with incomplete instruments and 3-407 dealing with 
alteration. In so far as applicable they read as follows: nWhen a paper whose con-
tents at the time of signing show that it is intended to become an instrument is 
signed while still incomplete in any necessary respect (and) if the completion is 
unauthorized even though the paper was not delivered by the maker or drawer a sub-
sequent holder in due course may enforce the instrument as completed" i.e. as againsi 
the party who signed the incomplete instrument. The risk of improper completion 
should be on the person who signed the incomplete instrument. (b) Innocent is liable 
on his contract of indorsement, either as a general indorser, if holder in due coursE 
bank knew nothing of the accommodation character of his i.ndorsement, or as an 
accommodation party in the capacity in which he signed if Bank did have such notice. 
Since Innocent never transferred the note for a consideration he is not liable for 
any breach of warranty. Note that under the N.I.L. "every indorsertt makes warranties~ 
while under the u.c.c. only those persons who are transferrers for a consideration 
make warranties. See u.c.C.I/#1.3-414; 3-415; .3-417. 
-;fbi 8. Madison handed Newman the following instrument on June l, 1961: 
none month after date I promise to pay to Bearer Three Thousand Dollars. 
This May 31,1961. 
D. Davis." 
It appeared regular on :lts face, and Davis was a man of substantial means. Madison 
said to Newman: "If you can sell this for me, I will gi-ve· you all over $2,500 you 
get for it." Newman took the paper to Trader and said: "Here is something good; : I 
need some cash so you may have it for $2,750 if you take it at once." Trader said, 
:'Dave, here is your money," and paid Newman $2,750 in cash. Ne~an. deli ver~d him 
the note without indorsement and paid Madison $2,500. At matunty 1t was d1scovered 
that allbhough Newman did not know it, the note was a forgery, and Trader demanded 
~ayment from Newman, telling him that Davis had refused payment because of the 
forgery. What, if any, is the liability of Newman to Trader? . 
·-
• 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) Since Newman did not disclose his agency he J.S as liable as 
if he had been acting for himself. Under the Uniform Negotiable Instrument law 
(section 65) one who negotiates by delivery only warrants that the instrume~t is 
genui ne and in all respects what it purports to be· Since Tra?er was Newman's · im-
mediate transferee the warranty ran to him and Trader is ent1tled to $3,000-- • 
what he would have gotten if there had been no breach of warranty. 
Q. 8 on p.5.38. Under u.c.C.#.3-417(2)(b) "Any person who transfers an instrument and 
receives consideration warrants to his transferee and if the transfer is by indorse-
ment to any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good faith that all 
signatures are genuine or authorized." Hence the answer is the same under the u.c.c. 
for the same reason. 
• 
• 
• 
l). M> 9. Thomas Jenkins negotiated with Plaintiff to purchase Plaintiff's stock of merchan-
dise and offered to give Plaintiff a note for the same after the value thereof had 
been determined by inventory. · Plaintiff would not agree to take the note unless 
Defendant signed the same as co-maker. Jenkins and Plaintiff approached Defendant 
and exhibited to him the following note: "Richmond, Virginia 
November 12,1959 
· "Twelve months after date I promise to pay to the order of Plaintiff $ 
for value received. Thomas Jenkins ----
" Defendant asked Plaintiff what the value of the stock of goods would approximate, 
and Plaintiff replied that he did not expect it to exceed $350.00. With that assur-
ance, Defendant signed the note in the blank space after Jenkins' signature. After 
the inventory, Jenkins filled up the note by inserting the figbll"e"$32$.0011 and 
handed it to Plaintiff, but Plaintiff gave it back saying he must have interest. 
Whereupon, Jenkins in.Serted the words "with interest from date at 6%" and transferred 
it to Plaintiff. The note contained no qlank for interest. 
On the due date, Plaintiff made demand on Defendant for $32$.00 plus interest from 
the date of the note, but Defendant declined to pay the same and asserted as his 
defense(a)that the insertion of "$325.00" in the note after he had signed the same 
relieved him of any obligation and (b)that the addition of the words "with interest 
from date at 6%" relieved him of any obligation on the note. Do the reasons for not 
paying the note asserted by Defendant in (a) and (b), or either of them constitute 
legal defenses? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS)(a) The reason stated here does not constitute a defense as 
the blank was filled in in strict accordance with the authority given.(b)The reason 
stated here does constitute a defense as noth1ng was agreed to about interest(which 
does not start to run on time paper until after maturity unless agreed otherwise) 
and the insertion of that provision constituted a material alteration which dis-
charged all parties on the instrwnent who did not consent thereto. 140 Ky .349, 
1~1 .Q .W1'7 
Q.9 on p.;22. The answer to (a) would be the same under the u.c.c. but the answer 
to (b) would be different unless the alteration was fraudulently made. u.c.C.#3-407 
(2) reads as follows: As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due 
course (a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges 
any party whose contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is pre-
cluded from asserting the defense:(b) no other alteration discharges any party and 
the instrument may be enforced according to its original tenor, or as to incompletf 
instruments according to the authority given. 
While the alteration was material it is not fraudulent. It was made openly under 
a claim of right. The parties thought they were putting in something that was left 
out. Hence plaintiff may hold defendant for $325 with no interest --i.e. defendant 
is not discharged, but liable as per the original tenor of the authorized instrument • 
---------- -
7~A~ner, in payment of a debt, gave Brown a check for Two Thousand Dollars drawn 
on Exchange Bank. Brown endorsed the check to Carson for value and two days later 
Carson presented this check for payment at Exchange Bank and was told by the Cashier 
that Abner had stopped payment on the check the preceding day, and although Abner's 
account was ample to cover the check, the Bank must decline to pay it. Carson at 
once informed Brovm of what had taken place and demanded payment from him, which was 
refused. All the parties are residents of Richmond. What,if any, are Carson's 
rights against, (l)Abner, (2) Bro~VJn, ru1d (3) Exchange Bank? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS)(!) Carscn, as a holder in due course, may recover from the 
drawer, Abner. Since Abner stopped payment he had no right to expect the check to 
be honored and need not be given notice of dishonor.(2) Carson could, if he wished, 
proceed against Brown who has promised to pay in event of dishonor. Since it was 
presented promptly and notice of dishonor given promptly, Brown is liable on his 
contract of indorsement.(3) Stnce a check is not(without more)an assignment Carson 
has no rie-hts ae-ainst the Exchane-e Bank. Q. 7 on p.538. Same answer under the u.c.c. for .the same reasons.(l)u.c.C.#3-511 
(2)(b) reads in part: "Presentment or notice ***is entirely excused when such party 
~HH~ has countennanded pa.yment.n (2) Note: A reasonable time for presentment in the 
case of an ordinary check is presumed to be within 30 days after date or issue 
whichever is later in the case of a drawer, and seven days after indorsement in 
case of an indorser. u.c.C.#3-503(2). And by U.C.C.#3-508(2) any necessary notice 
of dishonor must have been given by a bank before its midnight deadline and by any 
other person before midnight of the third business day after dishonor or receipt of 
notice of dishonor.(3) u.c.C.#3-409(1) reads: A check or other draft does not of 
itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available 
for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it . 
9;(~ploration Corporation discounted at Merchants Bank, Danville, Va., the follow-
ing instrument: 
11Norfolk,Va., Arpil 3,1961 
"Two months after date we promise to pay to t he order of James White Four 
Thousand Dollars at Blue Ridge Bank,Salem, Va. 
Indorsed on the back: 
The foregoing is the entire instrument. 
Exploration Corporation 
By W.F.Green,President11 
11 James White,Salem,Va. 
Thomas Brown,Roanoke,Va." 
In May, 1961, Exploration Corporation became i nsolvent and White moved out of the 
State. Merchants Bank knew these facts, and, therefore, without more, wrote Brown 
it would look to him for payment of the note. Brown refused payment, and Merchants 
Bank sued him. Has he any defense on the above facts? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) Yes. Brow~ was entitled to due presentment at maturity and 
prompt notice of dishonor if the instrum~nt was not pa,.d .. w~en properly presented. 
Presentment is not excused m.erely because .the Maker ' is · inso hrP.nt. -
Q. 9 on P• 539. The answer is the same under u.c.c. ##3-501 and 3-511 unless the 
maker is in insolvency proceedings instituted after the issue of the instrument in 
which case presentment is entirely excused but notice of dishonor must still be 
given. 
Q. 9 on p.554(Negotiahle Instruments)(l) Under U~C.C./Ih-201 the First and Farmers 
•• 
Bal!k uas an age1:t to collect regardless of the form of indorsement and regardless of • 
whether Crooked had the right to wi thdro.w or has wi thd:rc.nm the money unless there 
was clearly a contrary lntent~ Bu-t under U .c .c. lf#4-209 and 3..,303 Bank gave value 
when it permitted Crooked to draw out the proceeds and(if the other requisites of 
being a holder in due course are present) has become a holder in due course even if 
the item was r esti·ictively indorsed. {2) The answer is the same under the U .c.c. 
for the sal'Jle reason. 
• 
8. D8h June 1, 19)6 Pe t e r Porter sued Davj ci Dirk and Donald Dirk to recover a bal-
ance of $1,000 due on t he fo1lo~.ring j nstrw1tent: "Feb . 1, l ?S.S. One year after 
date we promi se to pay ·t-o the Order of Pe~er Po ... ·ter $2 , 000.(Signed) David Dirk ;I'res. 
(Signed) Donald Dirk , Sec. & 'l'reas . 11 Tl1e T'.o t e was not pai ci at maturity, and Forter 
instituted an action against Davi d lJirlc and DonaJ.d Dirk thereo~ .. The! filed an 
approprie.te pleading~ denying lio.1i.li ty. At the trial the. plalntl.~f lntroduced the 
note in ev.i.dence and res ted . Thereupon, the de~endants olfered evldence to show 
tha t, at the time the not e 1ras signed a:1d deli ve :::-ed ) it was t he intention of th8 par-
ties that only Mack Realty Cor porati on Has to be bound ~ t h2t Nack Realty Corpo:-ation 
had authorized the execution of the not e b~r its President aud Secretary, and hJ.c'i ' 
secured its payment by a d~ed of trust on real 
( a ) I s this evidence admissible? (b ) If Peter 
on ·:.he note , would it have been liable? 
'J ::.. -4 
estat e mmed by the Corporation. 
Port8r had s'J.ed Hack Realty Company 
( l'<'EGOTLI\.BLE UTSTRUMENTS) (a) No. This is an action on the note and not on the 
underlying obligation evideneed by the note. Section 20 of the N. I. L. reads in 
nar t : ,but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a 
r 6presentative character, wiLhout disclosing his principal, does not exempt him 
f rom personal liability." Note: It is arguable that since this i s an action be-
t Heen t he original parties the true situation can be shown and that we tvould then 
have n,ore than the mere addition of vmrds. (b) No, i £' he sued on the note. Sectio' 
18 of t he N. I. L. reads in part, "No person is liable on the instrumentwhose sig-
nature does not appear thereon." The doctrine of undi.sclosed principal i s not ap-
Plicable to a suit on a negoti able note. 
Q. 8 on p.553(Negotiable Inst.ruments)(a) Under U.C.Co//3··1..+03(b) parol evidence is 
admissible in an action inYolving only the original partie s to sho1-1 that it is the 
corporation's obligation and not that of an aeent who was authorized to sign for the 
corporation and who indicated that he was signing in a re:r;resentative capacity al-
though the representative did not disclose his prim:ipal. See .comment 3 to U .c.c. 
113-403 •. (b) The Corpora tJon is not liable ?n t~e ~~ • U .c .c .#3-401 (1) /eads, 11 No 
person is liable on an instrument unless lus Slgnatur8 appe.:trs thereon. However, 
if the Corporation received the conoideration, :i.t would be liable on quasi-con-
tractual principles to the holder of the note. The parties Hho signed are personall 
liable to those wo whom the note is negotiated, since they did not disclose their 
principal, but if an a gent pays a deb t vihich his principal should have paid, the 
agent is entitled to re-imbursement. 
9 -~rusting, a res:l.dent of Caroline County 1 Virginia, purchased a 1959 Sus sex au-
tomobile from Crooked, giving him in payment theref or a check f or $2 , 000 dralilll on 
the State 'l'rust Company of Bowling Green. Crooked endors ed the check, depos i ted 
it to his a ccount at, the First & Fanners Ban!{ of Richmond, immediately dr evl out 
the proceeds and sailed for Austr ali a. 
Two days later 'I'rusti ng learned that the automobile which he had purchased f rom 
Crooked had been stolen from a used car dealer i n Ladysmith , and he immediately 
stopped payment on the check at the State Tr ust Company. 
The First & Fanners Bank , knowing nothing o i' t hi s f r audulent transaction 1 pre-
s ented the check for paymen t; at the State 'I'rust Company and fo,md that payment had 
been stopped , and i t now consults yo u e.nd asl".s : (1) 1-Jhethe:r it is a holde r in due 
cour se of the check or merely Crooked 1 s agent f or its collection? ( 2) ldould an 
a etion agains t 'l'rustinr, for payMent of Lhe $2,000 be sur:;cessf ul? 
(NEGO'l'IABLE INS'l'RUlVJENTS) (1) The Bank wc:s a holder in clue course since t Le che ck 
w2.s presumably indorsed non- rest rict ively, i.e. ) in bl ank or spe c:i.ally t o Bank , and 
Bank has taken :Lt in good faith and given value by honoring Crooked's r equest fo r 
the proce eds . (2) Yes. A s top payment order i s no defense as against a holder i n 
due course . Tr usting , having s topped payment, could not r easonabl y expect that t he 
drawee bank would honor the che ck and hence is not en L,itl ed t o presentment and no-
t ice. of di ::d1onor. 
~~Morris drew his check upon the Farmers Bank of Richmond payable to Graham C. 
Jennings in payment of the .purchase price of a residence in Henrico County. Jennings 
then presented the check to the bank for payment, but due to a bookkeeping error on 
the part of the bank the check was returned marked ninsufficient funds." Upon re-
ceiving back the check from the bank, Jennings called a number of Morris' business 
creditors, and informed them that Morris had given him a bad check. As a result, two 
of these creditors refused Morris further credit in his filling station business. 
Morris now brings an action against the bank for refusing to pay the check. Jennings 
also sues the bank, alleging that because of the bank's refusal to pay the check he 
was unable to close a business transaction and thus sustained substantial losses. 
What is the liability of the bank{a)to Morris and (b) to Jennings? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS)(a) The bank is liable to Morris for any damages caused him 
by its failure to honor his check as the bank broke its contract with him to honor 
his checks if he had sufficient funds. By V#6-71 Norris may recover his actual prov-
able damages.(b) . The bank is not liable to Jennings. V#6-543 reads, "A check of it-
self does not operate as an assigronent of any part of the funds to the credit of the 
drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder unless and until it 
accepts or certifies the check." 
>j,_(,?- I 
9. Sam Jones drew a check on the Chemical Corn Bank of Crewe, Va., payable to the 
order of Charles Brown, and delivered the check to Brown for valuable consideration. 
Thereafter, Brown endorsed the check in blank and -delivered it to William Smith in 
.l-'C1b <:: ;JU7o 
payment of the purchase price of a Chesapeake Bay retriever. Smith, becoming fear-
ful as to the value of the check, took it to the Chemical Corn Bank of Crewe and 
had it certified by the cashier. Later it was discovered that Jones did not have 
sufficient funds on deposit and that the bank had erroneously certified the check. 
The bank now refuses to pay the check and Smith brings actions against Jones as 
drawer and Brown as endorser. How should the court f i nd as to(a)the liability of 
Jones, and(b) the liability of Brown? 
(NEGOtiABLE INSTRUMENTS)(a)and (b). Neither is liable. When the bank certified the 
check the request of the holder the drawer and indorser were discharged. It is the 
same as if the bank had cashed the check, and then the holder had purchased the 
bank's obligation as,for example, a eashier's check. V#6-542 reads, "When the holder 
of a check procures it to be accepted or certified the drawer and all indorsers 
are discharged from liability thereon." 
QQB and 9 on p.56B(Negotiable Instruments) would be answered the same way under 
the u.c.c. for the same reasons as the u.c.c. provisions are substantially the same 
as the N.I.L. provisions. 
-""'"'"' -' .. 
c J>tfi.xton, for a full and valuable cor.s i deration, eJu~cuted and delivered to P<:~ter 
a negotiable note in the amoumt of $10 11 000. Peter sold the note to Tommy, transfen ·-
Lng t i t le thereto by his endorsement. Braxton did not pay t he note upon its mat urit y 
dat e , whereupon, Tommy called upon Peter for payment. Peter promptly paid $3,000 
t o Tommy and at the time advised him that he was without funds to pay the balance . 
~)hortly thereafter Tommy sued Braxton for $10,000, the full amount of the note. 
2r axton defending the action, admi tted that he owed $7,000, wi th the interes t from 
date b~t he denied that Tommy was entitled to recover the full $10,000 because of 
the ~ayment of :1~3, 000 made to him by Peter. Is Tommy enti tled to recover $10, 000? 
(NEC~TIABLE INSTRUMENTS) Yes. Braxton is not entitled to the note as against Pet er 
until he pays the enti re amount. Moreover if Tommy recovers judgment on the note f or 
only $7 000 the obligati on on the :$10,000 not e would be des troyed by merger with a 
$7,000 judg~1ent to the detriment of Peter. Of Course Tommy holds anything he may 
collect in excess of $7,000 in trust for Peter. 
~. 8 on p.5B3(Negotiable Instruments) The question asked is not covered by t he 
N.I.L. or the u.c.c. There is no reason to believe that the adopt i on of t he u.c.c. 
changes the l aw as stated in the answer. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
9o~tllingsley executed his negotiable promissory note to the order of Rolfe, the 
note being payable at the Peoples and Mechanics Bank thirty days after date. The note 
contained a provision waiving presentment and notice of dishonor. Rolfe, before 
maturity and for value, negotiated this note by endorsing it to the order oft he 
Peoples and Mechanics Bank, tha.t bank being the holder of the note on its maturity 
date, and Billingsley had sufficient funds on deposit in a checking account in that 
bank with which to pay the note. Thirty days after its due date the Peoples and 
Mechanics Bank advised Rolfe that the note had not been paid at maturity, and cal]ed 
upon him to pay the principal of the note, with interest from its due date until 
paid. Rolfe refused to pay the note and the bank sued both Billingsley and Rolfe 
to recover the principal of the ncte and interest from its due date until paid. 
(1) May the bank recover the principal of the note from:(a)Billingsley (b) Rolfe. 
(2) May the bank recove:t interest on the note from its due date until paid fromt 
(a) Billingsley (b) Rolfe · 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) There can be no recovery from the indorser, Rolfe, of either 
principal or interest. By section 70 of the N.I.L. if the instrument is payable at a 
special place, and the maker is able and willing to pay it therG at maturity, such 
ability and willingness are equivalent to a tender of payment upon his part. A 
tender stops the running of interest as to both Rolfe and Billingsley, and entirely 
discharges parties secondarily liable such as Rolfe. It does not, however, discharge 
Billir;gsleyt s liability for the princj_pa 1 amount due. 
Q. 9 on p.583(Kegotiable Instruments) Virginia has adopted its own version of 
U.C.C.#3-121 which differs from the alternatives allowed by the U.C.C. The Virginia 
version reads, "A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank is 
not of itself an order to the bank to pay it, but the bank may consider it as an 
authorization to pay." And the Virginia verslon of u.c.C.#3-604(3) reads in part, 
"provided, however, in the case of an instrument which states that it is payable at a 
bank the maker or acceptor shall not be considered able and ready to pay unless he 
has specifically ordered the bank to pay the instrument out of funds on deposit wj_·~:r.. 
or otherwise provided to the bank for such payment. 11 (b) Hence there has been no 
tender. It follows that the maker, Billingsley, owes both principal and interest. 
Rolfe, however, was discharged. If a creditor(the bank) has in its control security 
given it by the debtor(Billingsley 1 s bank account which the bank could consider as 
authorization to apply to the payment of the note when it became due) the surety 
(indorser, Rolfe) will be discharged to hhe extent the creditor gives up his security. 
Bank is under a disability to recover frorn the indorser any loss which in the 
exercise of due diligence the bank could have avoided • 
8. J!J 1962, Boswell, Sr., made a loan to his son, Boswell, Jr., in the amount of 
$10,000, with which funds Boswell, Jr., purchased a farm. Boswell, Jr., executed 
his negotiable promissory note in that amount dated February 1, 1962, payable to 
the order of Boswell, Sr., on February 1, 1964. This note was secured by a deed of 
trust on the farm, which deed of trust was duly recorded in the proper clerk 1s 
office. Early in 1963, Boswell~ Sro, advised his son that it waa unlikely that he, 
Boswell, Sr., would live long enough to receive payment of the note, and that he 
had decided to make provision for canceling it. Without telling his son what 
59tl ~ 
p:1 oce::lure he intended to follow and without sur:m:!n.dering the note, Bost.;ell, Sr~ , 
wrote on the blue cover of the deed of trust the following ~ "At my death, the note 
Sdeured by this deed of trust is canceled and not to be collected. (s)John Boswell , 
Sr ." 
Bos~vell., Sr.s died on June 7,1963, with the note still in his possession. 'I'he ad-
J'Yiinis t.rator of his estate advised Boswell, Jr., of the t-Jriting on the deed of tru;:;t 
blue cover, but refused to deliver the note to Boswell,Jr. 
Boswell, Jr., consults you and asks you(l)whether the postponement of the eancella-
t ion of the note until Boswell,Sr. 1s death affected the validity of' the cancella-
tion, and (2) whether the fact that the recital of cancellation was made only on the 
deed of trust blue cover affected the validity of the canoBllation. 
How shm.'.ld you advise Boswe1l,Jr.~ with respect to questi ons (1) and (2)? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS)(l) No, it did not. The matter of renunciation of rights on 
a negotiable instrument is expressly governed by section 122 of the N.I.L. (V/16-475), 
and thus this controls rather than general principles of th~ law of wills.(2)Since 
the renunciation was in writing and the rights of no holder in due course are involv-
ed, the renunciation is effective even though not on the note. See 195 Va.92. 
Note: Section 3- 605 of the u.c .c. requires a written renunciation that has been 
signed a:J.d delivered, or that the instrument be su.r:rrendered to t.he party to be dis-
charged. Hence t11e.:re would not have been a valid renunciation if the U .C .C. had 
been in force. 
9!t~ooks was manager of the fir-e in&urC'l.nce department of General Insurance Co., 
a large and old company whi ch had opera~\ied successfully for many years under an 
elaborate internal control ayr-tem designed to pr event the fraud of its employees. 
Crooks prepared a fictitious fire insuranc.:e cJaim against the company, in the name 
of Sam Able, a fictitious person. Upon presentati on of this claim to the company,its 
treasurer caused it -to be put thr ough the control system bu.t the fraud was not de• 
tected, and the treasurer, belie~ing the claim to be bona fide, issued the company's 
check to the order of Sam Able. Crooks, in a disguised hand_, endorsed the name of 
Able to the check and presented it for payment to National B!lnk, on whom it was 
drawn. National Bank paid the check and charged it to t he account of General Ins.Co. 
Crooks immediately disappeared from t.he cvuntry. 
Upon discovering the fraud two weeks later, General Insurance Co. consults you 
and asks you ;.rhether it is entitled to recover from National Bank the amount of the 
check ,. How should you advise General Insurance Co o? 
(NEGOTI A.BLE I NSTRUMENTS) The loss is on the Insurance Company since under Virginia's 
amendment to bhe N.I.L. (V#6-361(3) the check was payable to bearer. This portion of 
our l aw reads, "The i nstrument is payable to bearer:(3) When it is payable to the 
order of a fic t iti ous or nonexisting or living person not j_ntended to have any 
interest in it, and such f act "1-TaS knov-m to t he person naldng it ~o payable, (or known 
to his employee or other agent who supplied the name of such payee"). The part in 
parent hesis was added in 1956. 
Note: The srune result is reached i n a different way under the u.c.c. The check is 
order paper, but an indor43pment by any per son in the name of a named payee is 
effective for negotiation- an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied 
him with the name of the payee intending the la t ter to have no interest therein. 
u.c.c. 3-405. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
[\ c '1. 616. 8., '-"Janfes Smith, a high school student, . aged, twenty, ...,sold Dealer an automobile which 
l1e owned, taking as part of the purchase price Dealer's negotiable note for $500 
pajable siK months after date to Smith. Next day &~th endorsed this note to Finance 
Corporation. Dealer failed to pay the note at maturity, claiming that the car did 
not fulfill the warranty made by Smith at the time of the sale. Finance Corporation 
pa.id full value for the note and knew nothing of the transaction ttut of which it 
arose, and believed Smith was twenty-one years old. 
Finance Corporation, one year after the maturity of the note sued Smith and 
Dealer on it. Smith pleaded infancy, and Dealer pleaded breach of warranty and that 
Smith, being an infant, could not pass title to the note. 
How ought the Court rule on each plea, assuming that there was a breach of 
warranty? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) Smith's plea of infancy is good. Infancy is a real defense 
good even against a holder in due course. Since Finance Corporation is a holder in 
due course it took free from the defense of the breach of warranty. Even though 
Smith was an infant, he had the power to pass the title to the note notwithstanding 
the fact that he is not liable on his indorsement. Smith's infancy is a personal 
defense an:i hence not available to Dealer. SeeVf/c-374 Note~ The U .C .c. does not 
change the law en these points. 
) l~' 9~ 0Wilson, intending to purchas~ some stock from Zerab but, not being certain of the 
spelling of his name or of his initials signed the following instrument: 
ltThirty days after date I p::·omise to pay or order, Two 
Thousand Dollars. 
POctober 15, 1963 
"H.n. Wilson" 
This paper was left on Wilson's desk. A clerk saw it, filled in his own name as 
payee and negotiated it to Farmers Bank for value. ThG clerk then left for parts 
un}mown. Is Wilson liable to Farmers Bank on the note? 
(NEGOTIABLE INS'l'RlfiviENTS) Assuming that Wilson's leaving it on his own de~k. is not 
negligence, Wilson is not liablo. V#6-367 reads, "\o.fuen an incomplete instrument has 
not been delivered it will not, if completed and negotiated wi~hout authority, be 
a valid contract in the hands of any holder, as against any person whose signature 
was placed thereon before delivery." Note: The rule is the reverse under U.C.C.J-
407 (3). 
7 }~ltailer of Roanoke, Va., executed the f<Jllowing instrument: 
•tRI")anoke, V:i:rginia, May 2, 1961. 
"Twenty days after sight pay to Dealer or order Two Thousand Dollars, 
value received. 
It Retailer 
"To J. Scott 
Exchange Building, Baltimore, Md.~ 
Retailer mailed this instrument to Scott, who endorsed on its.face, nAecepted, 
May J, 1961, J. Scott," and on the next day returned it to Reta1ler, who at once 
delivered it to Dealer in payment of a debt. Dealer then sold and endorsed the in-
strument to Financier of Norfolk, Va., who for value endorsed it to State Bank, 
May lOth, and on the 23rd it was presented in regular course of business to J.Scott 
who said; "I won't pay this becaus~ Retailer owes me money; just send it back." The' 
presenting agent, without doing anything else about the instrument, the next day 
called State Bank on the telephone and told it what had happened and sent the in-
strument back at once to State Bank. 
That institution now seeks your advice as to its rights against (a)Retailer, (b) 
J. scott,(c) Dealer, and (d) Financier. What ought you advise it? 
(NEOOTIABIE INSTRUMENTS) F.Yeryone is discharged except the acceptor, J. Scott, who 
by his acceptance is primarily liable thereon to any holder in due course. Since the 
bill of exchange was dra'l'rn in Virginia, and payable in Maryland it is a foreign bill 
of exchange. If such a bill is dishonored a formal protest is required to hold the 
drawer and indorsers. There was no formal pr~test, nor any waiver thereof. Protest 
must be made on the day of dishonor unless delay is excused or the bill has· been 
duly noted. See V/!6-505 and 6--508 • Note: Under the U .c .C. the states are not foreign 
to each other, so this would be an inland or doJnestic bill rather than a foreign one 
-s;_,& { 
7 •. Over a period of years Spend Thrift had borro1-red various sums of money from his 
sp1nster aunt~ Elvira. At the beginning of each year he viOuld give her a note pay-
a.ble at t~e end of that year for tl:a &mount due_. at which time he would take up 
the exist1ng note and pay .her the lnt&rest on the balan(:e o This procedure continued 
until Spend Thrift's death in November of 1963o Timonthy Trifle after his apooint-
t ~ . , ... ~en as acmnnistrator of the es'l;ate of Spend Thrift, receiYed a claim from Elvira 
1n the form of a n;~o ·~iable note in the ~~-n. of $1,~00 dated the preceding January, 
executed by Spend rnn.ft and payable to E.Jvua. Tr1fle noticed an erasure in the 
note, and l·Jas informed that Elvira had altered thi s data of payment from ten years 
to one year. She stated that this was done after Spend Thrift's death because cne 
year was the original agresment and she d:id not notice the mistake until afterwards. 
On this point she had corroborating evidence. Elvira instituted an action on the 
note and the above facts were proven. May Jnvira reccver on the note? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) Under the N.I.L. (Seuti.on l2h) <?..ny material alteration 
avoids the instrument except as agains t a party who has himself made, or assented 
to the alteration and subsequent i ndorsers. Unles s Elvira successfully first secures 
reformation she cannot sue on the not.e. However, s:i.nce she did not act .fraudulently 
she can recover on the underlying obligation. See 176 Va.255. 
Under U .C .C .3 ·.~07 a non fraudulent mate rial alteration does not avoid the in-
strument and it may be enforced as per its original tenor·. 
S ;J~Jbe Consumer, in payment of a past-due grocery b:Ul, executed a nE;g0ti;:;.ble nu:t.e 
i.n usu.al form in the su:rn of $500 payo..ble to A iJe_ Gr~cP.-r:-, tni rt.y (30) day:; after d <"~ t .c , 
C :.~ocer was unable to pay his obligations, and forty-five(4.5) days a.fter t~1e date he 
r eceive;d eonsw:ner' s note he endorsed ana daliveretl this note to Ernest Wholeaal~r 
f or value. 1'/holesaler instituted an action against fionaumer on the note to c:ollect 
tl~e :1~500. Between the date of the note and its transfer to Wholesaler, Consumer had. 
r eeov8rod a $200 judgment against Grocer a2 the result of a r.ri.nor automobile 
·~oll:Lsion. Upon the trial of the action instit.uted by Wholesaler, Consmn9r sought to 
se ·~ of f his uncollected judgment against Grocer. Over objec i:.ion, may he do so7 
( NEGOTB.BLE INS'I'RUMENTS)(Same answer under either N.IoL or U .c.c. and for same 
ren~ons). No, he may not do so. Vl.lhile it is true that one who takes after maturity 
is not a holder in due ~ourse and hence tru~es subject to defenses, a distinction is 
drawn by the better reason<3d ca.se.s between a set- off which arises from an entirely 
independent transaction, and a defense >vhich arises in conr,ection with the notee 
'rhe set··off stands on its own two fee t and can. be used only a gainst Grocer unless 
a statute expressly provides otherwise. V//8.,.,94 Hhich d·Jes provide otherwise express-
ly applies only .· . .. - .to .· , · assignees of non-negotiable ~.n.str.uments. See 163 Va.417 
for exhaustive an<J.ly::::is. 
9! 5-iel Kemper, an insurance Hgont, solicited an a pplication for· a $10~000 life in-
surance policy from Dro Elbe:::-t Payne, and received from Payne a negotiable note in 
proper form, payable sixty(GO) days aftf:r date tv Kemper f e r the $600 premiurn o This 
note was to be held cy Kemper pending Pay:-.te 1 s ~)hysir;al examination, and subsequent 
issuance of the policy by th'3 insurance , ~ompany, and if the poHcy vias not issued, 
t!"l.e note was to be returned t o Payne. The insv.rance corr,pany r efused to issue a policy 
to Payne. However, Kemper, in -.ri ola tion of the agr eemt"mt, discounted the note for 
fnll value at Citizen's Bank before ma turity, without notifying t!l.e Bank of the 
condition, and pocke ted the money. 
Dr. Payne now asks your ad'!ice as to his liab:i.li ty to the Bank for the note. 
How ought you P.dv lse? 
{NEGOTIABLE INSTR.Ut1EN'I'S) Dr., Payne is liahle since Bank i s a holder in due course. 
It takes free of equities of ownersllip and ·t-rans f ers i n bre ::~<;h of trust both under 
the N.I.L.(Section 57) and U ~ C. C . 3-3G5o 
,If' 4 June 1964 • 
This Section contains some q'lestion~3 vThich i nvolve t he l aw of negotiable 
instruments. In an::n-mring each of' t hese ques t ions l o;;: mu.~ t s tate whether 
your answer is ba ~ ed on the nego t b ble instl"Uments 'Iaw(N .r.L':'TPresently 
in effec ·t in Vi rginia, or on the unifor m comme:cicaJ. code(O .C . C.) which 
will become ef f ecti ve J :-:muary 1, 1966. A correct answer on either bas i s 
will receive full credit. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
4.)/filafler ga.•1e his negotiable promis sory note tG Smith :tn payment of the pnrchasP. 
price of an acrc'l of real es·~.::tte :LJ. FJ.or:l.O.a which Smith represented as fronting on 
Main Street in Niami. In fc:.ct., the land was under s:i.x feet o.f water in a nearby 
swamp. Thereafter, Smith indr;rsed the note for value to the ord!3I' of Crain who had 
no knowledge of Smit.h 1 s deceit. C:cain then indorsed the note for v-alue to Iversen 
who, prior thereto P had learnad of the transac·(;io.n between C:Laser and Smith, and 
of the deceit. of Smith. On th<:) due date of the note, Iv8rson made demand upon 
Glaser for payment which Glas9r r 8:fu.s2.do Glasce now eeeks your adYice on whether 
he is obligated to pay the no·co to Iverson. vJhat shou.ld your advice be? 
(NEGOTIABJ~E INSTRUMENTf,) Yesy he i s , und·sr both the U.C,C,(U.C.C.3~20l) and {N.I.L. 
#58) e Sin1.' e Iverson trc~.cen hi:.; ti t:!.e th:·ough a holder in C..ue cour~e and was not a 
par'Gy to the fr<Lud. j or as a prior holder cu.bjcct to any def':.!nse, he has all the 
rights of Crain. Since Glaser owed Cre..in there is no extra bur den placed an Glaser. 
Any other rule m::!..ght seriously limit a holder in due course 1 s :;.·ight to negotiate 
the inst1·ument further. This is frequently called the nshelt.er" or 11umorella" 
doctrine. 
r; J>iJihn P:ride had ser·1ed for r:w.ny yt.· ars a~ the bookkeeper for Ben Rote, a resta11rant. 
owner of !~orfolk, and had be'::n the -::mpl,)yee charged with t.he making of d~posits in 
and withdrawals f!'om t he Providen(;€': Ban_l{ with vJhich Rote c~onducted his ba.nking 
effairs. On Dee. 3, 1964 Pride went t.o the sho'\\>room of Fo:::-eign Autos, Inc., and 
HaS shO\vn a new Mercedes-Benz which was .for S<".le for $56.50. Pride told the salesman 
that he would ptu·c!lase the aut.omo'b:i J.a and wou.ld ba in on the following d2.y to close 
the deal. Early the next mo:t1:.:J.ng, Fride d:::-e1v a chec:k on the Pl•o·•rl.dence Bank for 
$5650 payable to Foreign .Autos., Inr:: ,, and cm·e:fully and c:.leverly forged Rote's name 
to the cheek t.s drawer. Pride then w ent to the bank, and told its Cashier that 
Rote had asked that the r:hed.:: be certified so tha-t it could be accepted without 
question by Foreign Autos, In-:! .,, in payment for the Mercedes• Benz which P:t;Lde 
stated was betng pur~has (:.ld by Ibto. The Ca.shier, having had many prior dealings 
with Pride and trusting him i'mpl:Lcj tly, certified the che'.':k. Pride then went 'io 
Foreign Autos, Inc., &.l!.d delivered the check. When asked by the salesman why ·:· ~.10 
check had been dr awn by Rote ~ Pz·ide rcpl:i.ed that it represented an agreed cred::i.t 
to be applied a gainst a larger sum oweJ '. Pr:i.de by Rote . Pride was then delivC;:rnd 
the Me;"cecl.es-Benz with an accompanying title certificat~g duly executed. Pride 
promptly drove c:.way to parts unknown. Rote coon learned of Pride's m.tsconduct and 
directed Prov-idence Bank not. to pay the che0h: o 
{a ) Assuming that Providence Bank had not paid the $5650 to ForeignAutos,Inr., , 
at the time of Rote's instructions as to non-payment, is it C·~)ligated to do so on. 
presentment of the check? 
"""~ ' (b ) A::;su;ning that Providence Bank had p.:>.id th3 $5650 to Fore,ign Autos 1 Inc .. , 
prior to the time of Rote•s instructions as to non-payment, is it entitled to re-
r;cver such zum back from Foreign Autos, Inc ~ ? 
(IJEGOTIJ\.BLE INSTURMENTS)(a) Yes, under both thu U.C.C.3-4l3(l) and the N.I.L.#62. 
C~rt~fir:;at.ion of a check i~ equiv-alent to an acceptance and the acceptor is pri marily 
b .. 91J .... e and engages to pay l t according to the tenor of his acceptance. Under Price 
Y. Nec>.l the acceptor admits the genuiness of the drawer's signature. (b) If the 
bank is under a duty to pay it, a fortiori it cannot reeover baGk what it was 
legally bound to pay • 
'J'L~~ 
7. SampGon executed and delivered to Rowland the following instrument: 
"Roanoke, Va .. , Ma.y 30, 1965' 
"Five days after date I promise to pay to John Rowland, or order, 
Five Thousand Dollars. The holder of this instrument shall have the 
election to require the assignment and delivery to him of my 100 
shares of Blue Ridge Chemical Corporation ctock in lieu of the payment 
of Five Thousand Dolla~s, in money. 
11 /s/ Virgj_l Samps0n 11 
On June 1, 1965, Rowland signed his nameon the 'Eack of that instrument and de,. 
liver·ed it to Jonathan Greely a Ten do.ys th0reafte:::- Jonathan Greely demanded that 
Virgil Sampson assign and deliver to him the 100 shares of Blue Ridge Chemical 
Corporation stock provided for in that instrument. Upon Snmpson 1 s refusal to de-
liver the stock, Greely sued Sampson to recover the stcck, or, in lieu thereof, 
$5$000, the face amount of the instlument. Sampson defended on the ground that 
the instrument was executed and delivered to Rowland for goods purchased by Sampson 
from Rowland, and that because of a breach of an express warranty he was not obli-
gated to perform according to the terms of the instrwnent .. 
Assumt ng that there wa.3 a breach of an express warranty, may this defense be 
successfully asserted by Sampson? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) N. I.Lc Answen lJo. Since the option to take something 
other than money is in the holder, and he can get money if he wishes, the instrument 
is negotiable and Sampson, as a holder in due course, takes free from the defense 
of breach of an express warrar..ty. See N.I.L,, 5(4)~ 
u.c.c. Answer: Yes. The u.c.c~ omits section 5(4) of the N.r.L. and as a result 
the power given the holder to demand s·i;ock destroys negotiability and Greeley took 
the instrument subjec~v to defE;nses. Sr:'e UoC.C ,.ff3-104(l)(b) and 3-112 and comments 
-thereto. The note gives holder a powe:c to dern.:;.nd something other than the payment of 
money. ,.... 
8 .)6-rj:zzly Bear vras an employee of Blacl< Forest Corporation. As a bookkeeper, Bear 
had authority to issue and s:Lgn checks on behalf of his employer. During the time 
Bear was worki ng for the Corporation he became hard pressed for money and he drew 
a check on the Corporation's deposito1·y Oak V.Tood NationaJ. Bank, payable to Honey 
Bee, in the amount of $2,1)000, and signed the check on behalf of the Corporation as 
dra>'i'er. Bear knew that ti1ere was no such person as Honey Bee and that the payee 
was fictitious. Shortly thereafter Bear indorsed the name of Honey Bee on the back 
of the check, then indorsed his o~m name on the back thereof and deposited the check 
to his personal account in tl1e Oak '\-J,)od National Bank. Bear promptly thereafter 
withdrew the $2,000 from his checking a.ccount and used it for his own purposes. 
After Bear withdrew the funds his employer lea:cned of the fraud practiced upon it by 
Bear and demanded that t:1e Oe.k Wood Na·tional Bank make payment to it of $2,000, the 
amount of the check charged to its account by the Bank. Upon refusal of the Bank 
to pay, the Corporation commenced an action against Oak 1.-!ood National Bank to re-
cover the amount of the loss. May the Corporation recover? 
(•TG0'2."'ABLE INSTRtnviENTS) N.I.L. Answer: Under Section 9(3) of the N.I.Lo the check 
'tl3.3 payable to bearer as the payee -vms ficti ti.ous and the person making the ch8:.:k so 
payable knelv that fact. Since Bear was o.uthorhad to write checks, and the bank 
paid bearer of bearer paper the Corporation cannot recover. 
u.c.c . Answer: u.c.C .. #3-405(l)(b) reads, "An indorsement by any person in the name 
of a named payee is effective if a person signing as or on behalf of a maker or 
drawer intends the payee to have no interest in the instrument.n Hence Bear's i n-
dorsem<::Tlt of the name nHoney Been was effective, Bank's p3.yment to Bear proper, and 
thus the Corporation has no right against Bank. 
• 
• 
• 
./ a~P~1 Alfred executed a promissory note to Bruce Baker as follows: 
July 1_, 1962 
I promise to pay to the orde1~ of Bruce Balcer the sum of Ten 
Thousand Dollars(l0-,000) at t he rate of four per cent(4%) interest 
per annum payable on July 1, 1967 c. Trcis note is given as the 
result of a contract.!' dated June 15 ~ 1962, bet1veen the parties 
hereto for the sale of a herd of 100 Black Angus steers in good 
condition. This note is secured by a deed of trust, dated July 1, 
1962, on Alfred Farm and is subject to the terms of the said deed 
of trust ~ In the event of default, the holder is entitled to 
recover the cosils of colJ.ection, includ.i..ng twenty-five per cent 
(25%) attorney1s fees. 
(Signed) Al Alfred 
Bruce Baker for value endorsed and delivered the note to Cal Kramer on October 3, 
1965, although Baker knew that Alfred was claiming that he had been defrauded by the 
sale. Alfred refused to pay the note on the due date, and Kramer retained an 
attorney and brought an action at law thereon. Alfred introduced uncontradicted 
evidence that he had, in fact, been defrauded and contended that Kramer, although 
a bona fide purchaser, was not entitled to recover on the note as a holder in due 
course because: 
-I ... "' 
(a)The note did not designate the pla~e of payment. 
(b) Tho note specifically referred to the sales contract as being the 
basis for the note and the reason for its execution., 
(c) The note stated that it wtis eecured by a deed of trust. 
(d) The note stated that it was subject to the terms of th8 deed of trust. 
(e) The note provided for attorneyts fees a nd the amount thereof was 
exorbitant. 
How should the court rule on each contention? 
(NEGO'l'IABLE INSTRUMENTS) Provisions a,bJc, and e do not effect the negotla'b:i.lit.y 
of the note since a negotiable instrument(a)need not state the place of paymmri:._. 
(b) may contain a statement of the transaction that gives rise to the instrumen-t- , 
(c) state that is secured by deed of tn~st, and (e) state that it is payable with 
attorney's fees. However (d) which makes the instrument subject to the terms of 
the deed of trust destroys its negotiability. One should not have to consult some 
other instrument in order to determine l-Jhether a note is negotiable. It would 
frequently be highly inconvenient to do so. 
, D r., ::-9. On June 15, 1960, R-obert Johnson, for consideration, executed a negotiable note 
proper in form for ~~10,000 payable to John Riley on or before June 15, 1965. 
Johnson suffered financial reverses, and in January of 1965, Riley on two occasion3 
told Johnson that he knew that J0hnson vms having a hard time and that he, Riley, 
didn't need the money and the debt should be considered as completely cancelled 
with no other act or payment being required of Riley. These conversa.liions were 
witnessed by three persons, includi ng Lambert. On March 15, 1965, Riley changed his 
mind and endorsed the note for value to Lambert. The note was not paid by June 15, 
1965, and Lambert aued Johnson fer the amount of the note. 
Johnson defended on the ground that Riley had cancelled the debt and renounced all 
rights against Johnson a.nd that Lambert had notice cf this fact. 
Is Lambert entitled to recover from Johnson? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMEfiTS) Yeso The renunciation to be effective under the U .c .c. 
must be in a signed writing delivered to the party lvho would otherwise be liable, 
or the instrwnent must be given to such party. See V#8&3-605 • 
5;)1fardup bought a radio from Dealer fo; $150 and gave him a check therefor drawn 
on X Bank. Mrs. Hardup decided they ought to have a color television as well, so . 
Hardup gave Dealer another check for $750, also drawn on X Bank, and Dealer deliver-
ed both the radio and the T.v. to Hardup's home. On his way to lunch that day, 
Dealer took botb of these checks to X Bank, and said to the receiving teller: naive 
me cash on the $150 item and place the other to my credit." Accordingly, the $150 
was paid over the counter to Dealer and he was given a deposit receipt for the 
$750. Later that afternoon the Bank, while posting the day's business and before 
posting the $750 to Dealer's credit, found that another teller had cashed a check 
on Hardupts account which completely extinguished that account, and thereupon the 
Bank immediately sent both the $150 and the $750 checks by a messenger to Dealer 
and demanded the return of the money and deposit receipt. Dealer refused to surrend-
er either and now consults you as to his right to keep the $150 and hold the Bank 
for the $750. How ought you· to advise? 
(NEGOTIABlE INSTRUMENTS) Under UCC and Va.Code #8.4-213(1) (a) an item is finally 
paid by a payor bank when the bank pays the item in cash and therefor the $150 
may not be recovered. However, under 8.4-301 when an item is deposited in the payor 
bank instead of payment being made over the counter, it is a provisional settlement 
and may be revoked by the bank and recovery had if the bank properly exercises its 
right of revocation prior to its midnight deadline(4-104). Therefore the bank 
having returned the item and demanded the return of the deposit receipt, the bank 
has right to cancellation of the $750 credit to dealer's account. 
6~omas was an accommodation indorser on Smith's note for $1,000, dated Jaunuary 
12, 1966, due in three months and held by Third National Bank. Two months before 
maturity Smith paid the Bank the note, but said: nnon 1t stamp it paid, I may need 
to use it again.n Accordingly, the Bank took the money and handed the note to 
Smith. Thirty days later Smith came back to the Bank and said: "'I was too quick 
about paying off that note, here it is again and I want my thousand dollars back."· 
Accordingly, the Bank took the note and credited Smith's account with a thousand 
dollars. Unknown to anyone Smith had lost heavily in speculation and hence was un-
able to pay the note at maturity. Is Thomas liable to the Bank? 
(NEGOTIA~IE INSTRUMENTS) Under UCC and Va.Code 8.3-601(3) the liability of all 
parties is discharged when any party who has himself no right of action or recourse 
on the instrument reacquires the instrument in his own right and under 8.3-208 
the facts in this case clearly constitute a reacquisition, discharging the 
accommodation indorser. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
7~D~br the balance due on the purchas~ of a tractor, Henry Smith execu~ e 
and delivered to John Jo~es his promissory note containing the followl~ 
language: 
"January 1, 1966" 
11 I promise to pay to the order of John Jones the sum of 
$1000 to be paid only out of my checking account at thf' 
First'National Bank in Roanoke, Virginia~ in two instal.; 
ments of $500 each, payable on May 1, 1966, and on July 
1 1966 provided that if I fail to pay the first instaJ. m~nt on'the due date, the entire sum shall become 1mmed5. 
ately due. (Signed) Henry Smith." · 
On April 15, 1966, Jones, for value, endorsed the note to William 
Johnson. 
In an action on the note by Johnson against Smith, the latter co:nte:nc 
ed that he had a defense of fraud in the procurement against Jones whir~ 
te e could assert aga inst Johnson, because the note was not a "negotiable' 
one under the UCC for the following reasons: 
(1) It did not recite 11 For Value Received." 
(2) Because of the acceleration clause, the note was not 
payable at a def~nite time. . 
(3) It was not an UL~ . nditional promlse to pay. 
How ought the court to decid e on each defense? 
(Negotiable Instruments) 
(1) There i s no need to recite consideration in a note tc 
make it negotiable. See Va. Code 8.3-121 (1) (a). 
(2) An acceleration clause does not de stroy negotiabilitl 
under the ucc. See Va. Code 8.3- 109 {1) (c) 
(3) Payment out of a s pecific source is not an unconditic 
a l promise to pay. Therefore the instrument is non-
ne gotiable and thi s i s a good defense. See Va. Code 
8.3-105 (2) (b). 
xJ,1 
6./Wh1le in the office of Herb Wood, Jack Smart secretly took from Wood's desk a 
blank check which named Richmond Bank as drawee. On the next day Smart filled in 
the blanks on the check by dating it and making it payable in the amount of $1,500; 
by forging Wood's name as drawer; and by writing in his own name as payee. Smart 
later endorsed the check to Harry Hunt who accepted it in good faith as pc.;yment for 
100 shares of the common stock of Ajax Corporation, the endorsed certificates for 
which Hunt delivered to Smart on receipt of the check. Shortly thereafter Hunt 
presented the check to Richmond Bank and was paid $1,500 in cash. Richmond Bank has 
now learned that it cannot properly charge Wood's account, and asks you whether it 
may recover from Hunt the $1,500 paid him. What should your advice be? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) No, the Richmond Bank cannot recover from Hubt the $1,500 
paid to himu Under #8.3~302, Harry Hunt was a holder in due course since he took the 
instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of any defense against it. 
When Hunt presented the instrument to the payee bank and received $1,500 in cash, 
he made no warranties of presentment and transfer as to the payee bank since, under 
#8.3-417(1)(b)(iii), Hunt, as a holder !tin due course, obtained the acceptance (of · ·' 
the payee bank) without knowledge that the drawer's signature was unauthorized." 
This is the principle of Price v. N8.1.l which held that a drawee of a draft is pre-
sumed to knew the signature-oF his-c-ustomer, the drawee, and, thus, is in a better 
position to discover the forgery. Therefore, the hblder, Hunt, having no knowledge 
of the forgery at the time of acceptance, is not charged with the no:;:mlllwarranties 
of a transfer and is perfectly entitled to enforce the acceptance mf the drawee 
bank under #8.3-418. If he thus had a right to enforce the acceptance, such right 
would be valueless if after enforcing it and obtaining payment, he became obligated 
to return it for breach of warranty. Therefore, Hunt would not be liable to the 
drawee bank for breach of warranty. 
7;ffo~ Cain was supervisor of the shipping department of Machine Mfgo,Inc., a large 
corporation operating in the City of Richmond. In February of 1967, Cain found 
himself in need of funds and, at the end of that month, submitted to Thomas Abel, 
the TreasuEer of the corporation, a payroll listing which showed as an employee, 
among many others, "Ben Darius 11 to whom was allegedly owed $400 for s ervices rend-
ered the corporation during the month of February. In fact, ther e was no employee 
named Barius. Relying on the word of Cain, Abel drew and delivered to him a series 
of Corporate payroll checks, drawn on the corporate account in the Capital Bank, 
one of which checks was made payable to the order of Darius for $400. Cain took 
the check, endorsed on its back llBen Darius", cashed it at the Capital Bank and 
pocketed the proceeds. He repeated the same procedure at the end of March, April 
and May. In mid-June, Machine Mfgo,Inc., learned of Cain's fraudulent conduct, 
promptly fired him, and commenced an action against Capital Bank in the Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond seeking a judgment for ~~1600. 
Should Machine Mfg., Inc., recover the judgment? 
( NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) No, the Machine Mfg., Inc. should not recover the judgment. 
Under the u.c.c., #8.3-40S(l)(a) the rule is stated that when an impostor induces 
the maker or drawer to issue a negotiable instrument to him in the name of a payee 
who is in effect nonexistent or is meant to have no interest in it, an indorsement 
by any person in the name of the: named payee is effective to negotiate the instru-
ment. Under the NIL #9(3), such instruments would have been payable to bearer. The 
UCC has changed this so that they are made payable to order. The rationale for 
this provision is that the loss; regardless of the type of fraud which the particu-
lar impostor has committed, should fall upon the maker or drawer. The end result 
of cases decided on this point under the UCC would be the same as those under the 
NIL, only the route would be different . Thus, the holding 294 Fed.839(4th Cir.l923) 
woul d control here. That case held that a drawee bank was not liable for paying an 
instrument payable to a fictitious payee, because it was a bearer instrument and so 
needed no indorsement. Under the UCC, it would have been payable to order but since 
it was indorsed, the Capital Bank could not be held liable. 
6J>~~~n Wren was the holder of the following note: 
nsept. 1, 1967 
"Thirty days after date I promise to pay to BEAREH, or order, $3,000. 11 
11 Bob "White" 
This note bore the accommodation indorsement ?uf Bald Eagl e . Robin Wren died be-
f ore the due date of the note and his daughter and sole heir at law, Sally Wren, 
presented the note to Bald Eagle on October 30 and demanded payment as the maker 
was : in default. At the t i me payment was demanded, but befor e it was made, Tommy 
Sparrow, a nephew of Robin Wren, exhi bited to Bald Eagle what purported to be a 
w i ll of Robin Wren, by the terms of which that note was bequeathed to Tommy 
Sparrow, and Sparrow demanded payment to him G Sally Wren denied that the will was 
genuine and insisted that t he note be paid to her. Bald Eagle paid the not e t o 
Sally wren who had possession. Later, in a contested proceeding, the paper writing 
pur porti ng t o be t he will of Robin wren was admitted to probate as the last will 
and testament of Robin Wren. Whereupon, Tommy Sparr ow, who had r eceived the note 
from Wren's Executor, called upon Bald Eagle t o pay the note . Eagl e refus ed t o pay 
and as the maker of the note was insolvent Sparrow sued Eagl e on the not e . 
May Sparrow recover. 
. f4V O 
( NEGOTIABLE I NSTRUMENTS ) No . Under 8 .3-603 the liability of any party i s discharge? to 
:o the ext ent of his payment or sati sfaction t o the hol der even though it is made Wlth 
knowledge of a claim of anot her person t o t he inst:ument unle~s prior t o s~ch pa~­
ment or sat isfaction the pers on making the cla im e1t her suppl 1es adequat e 1ndemn1ty 
or enjoins payment or satisfacti on by. order of a cour t of competen~ j urisdi ction 
in an action i n whi ch t he adver se cla1mant and the ho l der ar e part1es . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
~ J J)j. 8~)~ hn Frisk purported to sell a valuable painting to Henry Miller and took in pay-
ment therefor Miller's Hegotiable promissory note date March 1, 1967, for $1,000, 
made payable to the order of Frisk on April 1, 1967. Frisk had not in fact owned 
the painting, but had stolen it from th~ Valentine Museum. On March 19th, Frisk 
duly endorsed the note to Frank Rhoads, ,who had no knowledge of Frisk's improprie-
ties, and who paid Frisk $950 for the n~te. On April 26tb, Rhoads duly endorsed and 
delivered the promissory note to his good friend, Paul East, as a birthday present. 
East accepted the note as a gift, secretly knm.ring that Miller had executed it in 
reliance on fradulent misrepresentations of FriskM On the day after the gift was 
made, East presented the note to Miller for payment, which was refused. Thereupon, 
E~st brought an action on the note against Miller in the Circuit Court of the City 
of Petersburg. 
On the trial of the case all the foregoing facts were provenJ and when both parties 
had rested, Miller moved the Court to strike the evidence of East on the following 
grounds: 
(a) that East had become a holder of the note after its maturity; 
(b) that East had become a holder of the note without giving consideration 
therefor; and 
(c) that East had become a holder of the note knowing of Frisk's fraudulent conduct. 
How should the 0ourt rule on each ground of the motion? 
(NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS) The court should overrule Miller's motion to strike the 
evidence as to all grounds relied upon by Miller. Under the UCC,#8.3-201(1), the 
so-called "Shelter Doctrine" has incorporated and applies here, The doctrine stated 
simply is that any person who transfers an instrument transfers whatever rights he 
has in it. The transfer of rights is not limited t o transfers for value. The 
instrument may be transferred as a gift and the donee acquires whatever rights the 
donor had. However, this provision cannot be used to permit any holder who has 
oimself been a party to the fraud affecting the instrument, or has notice of any 
defense against it to wash the paper clean by passing it on to a HDC and then re-
purchasing it. As it pertains to this case, when Rhoads purchased the note for value 
in good faith and with no notice of any claim against it, he became a HDC. "When 
East received the note from Rhoads after maturity and as a gift, he acqui red the 
same rights his donor, a HDC, had in it. Therefore, even t hough he had notice of 
the fraud, he was not a part to it, and is: protected und er the 11 Sheltern of this 
provision. East succeeded to Rhoad's rights as a HDC, cutting off the defense. 
Therefore, the f act that East became a holder of the note after its maturity, gave 
no consideration for it and had knowledge of the fraud, he i s protected and the 
court should overrule Miller's motion to strike his evidence. 
Failure of consideration i s a personal defens e and not good against a HDC or 
one who takes thro an HDC. 
s.D~Jiia Boswell was t he hold er of t he f ollowing not e : 
"Brandywine , Virginia , October 1, 1967 
.,Thirty days after date I promise to pay t o Julia Boswell, or or der , 
One Thousand Dollar s , f or value r eceived, negotiable and payable at 
the Br andywi ne Nat ional Bank, Br andywi ne, Virgi nia ." 
npeter Johnson" 
On i t s du e da t e, Julia Boswell pr esented the note t o the Brandywine National Bank 
and demanded payment. As Pet er Johnson had suff icient f unds i n his checki ng account 
in the bank to pay the not e t he bank char ged his account wi th 'll, OOO and paid the 
note t o Julia Boswell. Promptly thereafter the bank mailed t he note t o Peter 
Johnson and advised him that i t had been paid from his account. Pet er Johnson 
consults you and i nqui r es wh ether the bank had the r ight to pay the note and c harge 
his account. In t alking to Johnson you l earn that he has a valid defense to the 
not e of fr aud in the procurement and t ha t he coul d have suc cessfully defended an 
action on t he no t e . What would you advise? 
(NEGOTIABLE I NSTHUMENTS) Johnson should be advised that the bank had pr operl y paid 
t he note. Under D.J-121 a note whi ch states that i t is payabl e at a bank is not 
itself an or der to t he bank to pay i t, but the bank may consider it an authorization 
to pay . 
